Vertical agreements are agreements between companies located at different stages or levels of the production chain and, therefore, in different markets. A case would be an agreement between a manufacturer and a wholesaler. Vertical competition restrictions18 include: cartel and abuse practices include: (a) horizontal pricing agreements, (b) horizontal contracting agreements, (c) bid manipulation between competitors; (d) some horizontal group boycotts by competitors; and (e) sometimes binding agreements. Finally, an applicant has less responsibility to analyze the market in which the restriction is considered to be inherently anti-competitive. (National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. U.S. 435 U.S. (1878); In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 618 F 3d 300 (2010); or In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litigation, 739 F.3d 262 (2014). However, it is not clear from the legislation to what extent an applicant must define the contract in question. The rules found in U.S. jurisdiction regarding cartels and abuse of dominance stem from the perceived need for effective enforcement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which « prohibits very contracts, combinations in the form of trust or any other form, or conspiracy to restrict trade or commerce. » [1] Early judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act have established that a strict and literal interpretation would lead to the illegality of any agreement between two or more companies, since an agreement necessarily prevents one party`s competitors from winning the other party`s cases. [2] Thus, on the basis of a previous antitrust jurisdiction of general law and the mere need to promote the spirit of the Sherman Act, the Court found it necessary to apply a « common sense rule » in the Analysis of Sherman Act Section 1, in order to determine whether an agreement would effectively promote or suppress competition under the Act.
[3] The rule analysis is intended to compensate for the anti-competitive and anti-competitive effects of an agreement (the absence or existence of an agreement According to the Court of Justice ruling, agreements that improperly suppress competition constitute a violation of Section 1, while agreements that do not have a negative impact on competition are not. Here too, in the case of the Chicago Board of Trade against the United States 11, the « rule of reason » was discussed and explained. It states that the legitimacy of an agreement cannot be called into question by a simple test of limiting rivalry/competition. Each trade agreement and regulation is limited. Linking or controlling is their extraordinary quintessence. The real test of legitimization is whether forced deference, that is, it merely directs them and perhaps moves in that direction, advances competition, or whether it can, for example, stifle or even destroy competition. To ask this question, the court should generally consider the facts to be atypical in cases to which deference is related; its condition before and then after the restriction was imposed; the nature of the restriction and its effects, whether real or probable. The historical context of deference, the overly existing betrayal, the reason for accepting the specific remedy, the purpose or objective to be achieved are all relevant and applicable facts. It is not that good intent protects otherwise dubious regulation or the opposite, but also mere knowledge of intent can help to interpret the facts and predict the consequences by the courts. A contract, combination or conspiracy that unduly restricts trade and does not fall into the category per se is generally analyzed under the test of rules.
This test focuses on the state of competition within a well-defined relevant agreement.
